Is Kenya a hotbed of terrorism?

Immense energy has gone into demonizing CNN over a recent report about Kenya. This report suggested that Kenya was a hotbed of terrorism and that it was not safe for the President of the United States (POTUS) to visit the country. President Obama is actually in the country to co-host a Global Enterpreneural Summit (GES) being held in Nairobi. The objectives of the summit include, among other things, empowering the youth as a countermeasure for radicalization into terrorism. So what was the problem with how CNN reported this visit?

Hotbed? Really?

One thing that Kenyans on twitter (#KOT) appeared to be incensed with is the use of the words ‘hotbed of terrorism.’ According to the CNN report President Obama was visiting ‘not only his father’s homeland…’ but a country festering under the weight of AlShabaab. The show continued by incorporating two ‘security experts’: one a former secret service agent and the other a former Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) agent. These two experts proceeded to provide their ‘expert analysis’ about how unsafe Kenya was for Obama’s visit.

What caught my attention the most is lack of credible data as well as use of spurious facts to make conclusions that are invariably wrong and, dare I say, offensive. One of the analysts suggested that the ‘11%’ Muslim population in Kenya made the country a dangerous place for a POTUS visit. The other cemented this idea by stating that Kenya was more dangerous than Iraq and Afghanistan! Is this depiction accurate?

Is Kenya the most insecure country on earth?

When discussing matters of security, there seems to be a lack of a coherent definition of the term. Traditionaly the referent object (or the unit of analysis if you like) has been the state. Therefore matters of security have – since the cold war era – been framed within the language of state survival. It is no wonder that nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) are the mainstay of international security agendas. But is this really security?

Other schools of though have emerged to challenge this state-centric approach. These other schools focus more on the wellbeing of the human being; the person living within the confines of the state rather than the state itself. This is what is referred to as human security. The proponets of this school make their case by comparing the average number of deaths and destruction caused by phenomena other than war or state conflict. To this end their scope of security includes economic, enviromental and social factors that impact on the prosperity of people.

However, I digress from the main pont of this post. The issue here to find out whether Kenya is the most insecure nation in the world. To do this I will restrict the security issue to the deaths caused by terrorism. Although quite a narrow conceptual frame of security in academic terms, it will serve the purpose of this post by comparing the fatalities in Kenya in 2014 compared to those of Iraq and Afghanistan.

According this Global Terrorism Index report, Kenya is ranked third most affected state in Africa as far as terrorism is concerned. It comes behind Nigeria and Somalia which occupy the first and second positions respectively. Looking at the facts, Kenya has been on the receveing end of AlShabaab attacks particularly after the former’s incursion into Somali in an operation dubbed ‘Operation Linda Inchi.’

However as compared to other countries in the world, Kenya is in position 12 globally in the list of countries most affected by terrorism. The top five countries on this list include Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Nigeria and Syria in that order. Further terrorism related deaths in these five areas accounted to 82% of the global average according to the report. This means that, in essence, these are the most dangerous places on earth as far as terrorism is concerned.

Further more, comparing the number of terror related deaths in Iraq and Afghanistan with those of Kenya reveals inconsistencies between the CNN’s ‘expert analysis’ and the reality on the ground. In 2014 a reported 306 Kenyan lives were lost due to terrorism. Compare this figure with that of Iraq’s 9,929 and Afghanistan’s 4,505 and one begins to wonder how CNN came to the conclusion that Kenya is a hotbed of terrorism.

Was the framing of Kenya by CNN wrong?

I tend to think so. In light of statistics provided, the so called analysts got it wrong. Just because Kenya has been severally attacked by AlShabaab does not make it the most dangerous place on earth. Secondly, CNN erred in accepting the notion that Kenya was more dangerous than Iraq and Afghanistan without asking for substantiation. This action underscores what I have been increasingly observing in today’s media; the use of ‘experts’ whose justifications for their conslusions in arguments is nothing more than their credentials. Students of philosophy have a name for this; they call it expert fallacy.

Concluding thoughts

No Kenyan can suggest that Kenyans have not faced problems with terrorist or terrorism, unless they have been living under a rock. However the way CNN framed the issue made Kenya appear like a failed state; like terrorism is what defines the Kenyan people. This, in my opinion is very irresponsible reporting and should be shuned. It should also not be forgotten by CNN producers that Kenyans have neither forgoten nor forgiven you for this report on the 2013 general elections.

Would forcibly sending Somali refugees home improve Kenya’s security?

On 11th of April, 2015, the Kenyan Deputy President Hon. William Ruto ordered the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to close the Dadaab refugee camp within three months. This means that a total of 335,565 Somali refugees will be required to leave Kenya by end of June 2015 or the Kenyan Government will forcibly remove them. This news was jubilantly received by Kenyans, if late night news polls are anything to go by.

However few are critically and rationally reviewing the rationale of moving the refugees and its implications. This blog post attempts to do this as a way of contributing to the debate on the efficacy of such a move. The posts looks at who a refugee is and addresses the nexus between hosting them and national security in Kenya. It also looks at the implications of forcible repatriation of these refugees into Somalia. It concludes by addressing alternative means to address Kenya’s security challenge while adhering to the law governing refugee protection.

Who is a refugee?

A refugee is a person who flees their home; crosses an internationally recognized border to seek protection from persecution (loosely defined as discriminatory treatment) or events seriously disturbing public order. According to available statistics there are about 1.6 m refugees in the world 50% of whom are under the age of 18 while 49% are women. In Kenya, the refugee population stands at about 569,772 with a majority being Somali refugees followed by Ethiopian and Congolese refugees. Most of the refugees in Kenya, like the Somali, have fled their countries of origin owing to conflict; much like the Kenyans that live in Uganda having fled the post-election violence in 2007/08.

A person becomes a refugee after an evaluation process called the refugee status determination (RSD). This process sieves genuine refugees from other non-deserving elements such as combatants and terrorists. Therefore, before a person can be granted refugee status, their refugee claim is thoroughly investigated to ensure that they are genuine. This means that refugee protection is civilian in character and its aim is to protect persons who flee their countries of origin to save their lives and limbs.

Are Somali refugees a threat to national security?

There has been a lot of talk about refugees, particularly Somali refugees, being a threat to national security. But is there any evidence to this? Recent experience shows that there is none.

In December, 2012, the Government of Kenya ordered that all urban residing refugees be relocated to the camps. The main argument presented by the government was that they presented a threat to national security and thus needed to be contained in refugee camps. A case was lodged at the High Court to challenge this argument. The government was given an opportunity to present evidence that links refugees to insecurity in the country; it failed.

In December, 2014, the Government of Kenya – through the Security Laws Amendment Act, 2014 – attempted to limit the number of refugees in the country to 150,000. A case was lodged at the High Court to inter alia challenge this provision of the Act. The government was given another opportunity to prove the causal link between hosting refugees and insecurity in the county; it failed.

These instances lead one to conclude that the government lacks evidence that links refugees to insecurity. What pervades public discourse at the moment are generalizations not based on facts. But if there isn’t evidence directly linking refugees to the current insecurity in the country, why are they being targeted? The answer to this question lies in the gaps in our security system.

The Refugee Consortium of Kenya conducted a study in 2012 that partly looked at security at the Dadaab refugee camp. One of the findings was that Somali refugees, particularly those that left Somalia in 2011, escaped forcible recruitment into al-Shabaab. Further, the report showed that even after escaping into Kenya to seek asylum from this militia, some recruiters still followed them to Dadaab to recruit their children and young men. How is this possible? How can al-Shabaab access the Dadaab refugee camp without detection?

This investigative piece appears to provide an answer: corruption and complacency. Granted that the Kenya-Somali border is porous, riddled with many unofficial routes (panya [rat] routes), however corruption poses the greater danger to our national security. This is how arms and combatants can be able to make their way from Somali, past government check points to recruit refugee children into their ranks. This is how arms and militia personnel can be able to come from Somalia past government check points and hit Nairobi’s Westgate Mall and Garissa University College.

Be that as it may, al-Shabaab operatives are not the only ones recruiting fighters from the camps. In a 2009 report, the Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) stood accused of militarizing the camp. Young Somali men were openly and blatantly recruited to join the Transitional Government Forces (TGF) fighting al-Shabaab at the time. Although the exercise was later abandoned, damage had already been done as most of these fighters, with arms and training from the KDF ended up joining the ranks of al-Shabaab. This demonstrates complacency on the part of the government which is supposed to protect the lives of civilian populations in distress of terror from the al-Shabaab militia.

What are the implications of forcibly sending refugees to Somalia?

The first and obvious implication would be Kenya would be in violation of its national and international obligation to protect refugees. The law dictates that refugees cannot be forcibly taken back to their country of origin where the threat to their lives or physical integrity still exists. This is the principle of non-refoulement. In the Somali case, al-Shabaab is still a real threat for Somali refugees and this could be the reason many of them are hesitant to return home despite there being a tripartite agreement aimed at voluntary repatriation of Somali refugees in safety and dignity.

Secondly, and perhaps not so obvious, is the danger of driving fresh recruits into the hands of al-Shabaab. Forcibly pushing these refugees into Somalia would first create resentment and secondly foment desperation. Al-Shabaab would be keen to use these two ingredients to recruit this population into its ranks.

Thirdly, and most importantly, it will divert attention from the real issues affecting our security system: corruption and complacency. Kenyans know only too well that billions of shillings have been diverted from public coffers for private gain. This includes security related contracts. Before the Garissa attack, there was huge public outcry over the level of corruption in the internal security docket (as it then was).

Another monster is the complacency levels within the security structure in Kenya. How often have we heard that intelligence of an attack here or there was available and nothing was done to prevent it? How often have we been regaled by blame games following a terrorist attack and nothing seems to change? During the Westgate attack it was the lack of coordination that prolonged the siege after KDF forces shot and killed a Recce company squad leader leading the latter to retreat. Again lack of coordination cost more lives in the Garissa attack where the Recce company took more than eight hours to arrive at the scene to conduct a 12 minute operation. It should not be lost on Kenyans that these lapses, what I call complacency, is the major reason the government cannot contain the terror menace.

What alternatives are there to forcible repatriation?

The first alternative to this is to officially recognize combating corruption and complacency as a key pillar to the counter-terrorism strategy in Kenya. These are the real challenges plaguing national security in the country. So long as these two exist, Kenyans may not know any reprieve from terror attacks.

Secondly, the intelligence and operation branches of the security forces should endevour to isolate and arrest those individuals in the camps recruiting refugees into al-Shabaab. These are the real culprits and a serious threat to Kenya’s national security.

Thirdly, the Government of Kenya should focus more on the voluntary repatriation process already in place. Through this process, Somali refugees will peacefully and voluntarily relocate into Somalia without the risk of bitterness that may drive them into the hands of the determined al-Shabaab operatives.

Conclusion

In conclusion, it should be noted that the refugee regime is a civilian and humanitarian affair. The regime has a protective element embedded in it that segregates genuine asylum seekers from individuals involved in military operations and terrorism. Forcibly sending Somali refugees into Somali may prove to be counter-productive especially if the Kenyan Government is serious about stemming radicalization. Seriously dealing with corruption and complacency will provide a long-term efficient counter-terrorism strategy as opposed to blanket condemnation of a population in need of protection.

Dilemma of Combating Terrorism in Eastern Africa

To combat any issue in the realm of human affairs, it is often prudent to search for its roots. Having a proper understanding of what causes terrorism is paramount in addressing and defeating it. This post looks at some plausible causes of terrorism and evaluates the strategies that have been used so far.

This posts holds that terrorism may be caused by myriad of issues. In eastern Africa, it may be caused by historical marginalization of particular social groups from resource sharing and decisions making relating thereto. In other words, it may be caused by a disgruntlement over what the marginalized groups perceive to be denial of a greater role in their destiny.

These groups often feel as though they are in the fringes of public policy decision making. They feel as though their opinions over their lives are being drowned out by those whose power is greater than theirs. At such points do such groups feel that they need to exert some form,of pressure until their political objectives are met. Therefore this post looks to terrorism as a virulent and violent form of protest at some perceived injustice.

Admittedly, not all forms of terrorism fall under this category. Like soldiers of fortune who profiteer from war mongering, there are those bellicose and avaricious individuals that look to terror as a means of livelihood; professional terrorists if you may. However these individuals are in the minority in the bigger global terrorism scale.

Terrorism should be viewed through the view of evolving warfare. The world is experiencing less and less of direct military conflict. This means that non-conventional warfare has taken center stage and must be viewed as a reality in international politics. Cases of terror attacks have been on the rise and appear to be accelerating, especially in eastern Africa.

As a means of warfare, it is often adopted in situations of acute imbalance of military power. This is where one party to the conflict is outnumbered and outgunned by another or other parties to the conflict. It aims to heap pressure on the stronger party to make concessions in favor of the weaker party by targeting non-military/soft targets such as civilians. The logic is, no government – as party to a conflict – will countenance the decimation of its population and thus it is hoped, by the terrorists, that the government will yield ground. But does it work? In other words how have eastern African governments responded to terrorism in the regions?

One thing is apparent in the regional, there is no clear strategy of tackling terrorism in the region. However Kenya, Uganda and Ethiopia have all responded in a similar manner to terrorism threats. They have all engaged Somali terrorist groups militarily in Somali with mixed results. On the one hand, Somali based terror groups such as al-Shabaab have been routed out of key towns such as Mogadishu but at the same time terror attacks have increased.

Therefore, how can we reconcile military achievement on the battle field and contemporaneous terror attacks? Is the military option a viable stand-alone strategy against terrorism? Should governments consider negotiating with such groups?

First, a stand-alone military option is not viable. In fact it may play into the hands of the terrorists more than eradicate them as it has the effect of legitimizing their claim in the eyes of would be sympathizers. In this post, it has been suggested that terrorism is a tool often used by political groups that perceive they are marginalized and thus spin their propaganda in this way. Therefore, if the military option is used exclusively, it gives these terror groups propaganda ammunition for recruitment which means a rise in radicalization.

Secondly, negotiating with the terrorist is also not viable. Negotiating with such group would also give them legitimacy and will validate their violence means for political ends. It will also encourage other groups to use the same means as a political bargaining tool which would be detrimental to national security.

So what would be the solution? This post suggests that terrorism cannot be defeated by force alone. There needs to be a comprehensive anti-terrorism policy that looks into nabbing terrorists but also addresses the root causes of discontent that would lead new recruits to join the ranks of terrorist groups. This dual approach could prove effective in addressing terrorism for long term peace and security in the region.